1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Michael J. Kent, Esq. (SBN 298564) Emily R. Pincin, Esq. (SBN 334566) KENT PINCIN 120 Fisherman's Wharf Redondo Beach, CA 90277 Tel: (310) 376-0922 Email: mjk@kentpincinlaw.com Email: erp@kentpincinlaw.com Nicholas S. Alexandroff, Esq. (SBN 309747) ALEXANDROFF LAW GROUP 16542 Ventura Blvd., Suite 203 Los Angeles, CA 91436 Tel: (818) 908-8899 E-mail: nicholas@alglegal.com Attorneys for Plaintiff VICTOR CRUZ			
12	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
13 14	COUNTY OF MERCED			
15 16	VICTOR CRUZ, Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: 7 [Assigned to 1 Courtroom 8]	Hon. Brian McCabe,	
17 18 19	v. HILMAR CHEESE CO., INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,	STIPULATI ALLOWING	ON AND ORDER G PLAINTIFF TO FILE MENDED COMPLAINT	
20 21	inclusive, Defendants.	FAC Filed: Trial:	November 1, 2022 September 3, 2024	
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WHEREAS, on October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Merced Superior Court; WHEREAS, on October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint; WHEREAS, on December 15, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint;

WHEREAS, on June 30, 2023, Defendant filed an Amended Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint;

WHEREAS, on November 2, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Summary

Adjudication of Defendant's Affirmative Defenses relating to Defendant's Amended Answer to

Plaintiff's First Amended Complain for filing, to be heard on January 19, 2024;

WHEREAS, Plaintiff intends to file a Second Amended Complaint to add the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; and (2) Violation of Civil Rights under the Unruh Act; as well as to seek additional damages for treble damages, declaratory judgment/relief, and injunctive relief.

WHEREAS, Plaintiff intends to add additional facts in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint outlining Defendant's policies and procedures relating to medical leaves of absence.

WHEREAS, a copy of the Second Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to stipulate to allow Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint and to file the Second Amended Complaint, in exchange for Plaintiff withdrawing without prejudice the summary adjudication motion which was submitted for filing on November 2, 2023 with a hearing date of January 19, 2024;

WHEREAS, Plaintiff's counsel spoke with the Court Clerk on or around November 9, 2023 and cancelled the filing such that the motion for summary adjudication was rejected and not filed.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED, by and between Plaintiff and Defendant, by and through their respective counsel, that:

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint and to file the Second Amended
Complaint (Exhibit "A"). Defendant reserves the right to file a response to the Second
Amended Complaint pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure within thirty (30) days
after service of the Second Amended Complaint on Defendant's counsel of record; and

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1	2. To the extent Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication is on the Court calendar,		
2	Plaintiff withdraws the Motion for Summary Adjudication without prejudice relating to		
3	Defendant's Amended Answer to the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff reserves the		
4	right to file a dispostive motion to any answer, and/or affirmative defenses asserted by		
5	Defendant in its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.		
6	D. 1.M. 1. 20.202		
7	Dated: November 20, 2023 KENT PINCIN		
8	$\frac{1}{2}$		
10	By:		
11	Michael J. Kent Emily R. Pincin Attorneys for Plaintiff		
12	VICTOR CRUZ		
13	Dated: November 20, 2023 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP		
14			
15	By: ST 3 MS		
16	Michael J. Burns		
17	Jonathan D. Martin Attorneys for Defendant		
18	HILMAR CHEESE CO. INC.		
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Michael J. Kent, Esq. (SBN 298564) Emily R. Pincin, Esq. (SBN 334566) KENT PINCIN 120 Fisherman's Wharf Redondo Beach, CA 90277 Tel: (310) 376-0922 E-mail: mjk@kentpincinlaw.com E-mail: erp@kentpincinlaw.com Nicholas S. Alexandroff, Esq. (SBN 309747) ALEXANDROFF LAW GROUP 16542 Ventura Blvd., Suite 203 Los Angeles, CA 91436 Tel: (818) 908-8899 E-mail: nicholas@alglegal.com Attorneys for Plaintiff VICTOR CRUZ		
11	SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MERCED		
	VICTOR CRUZ	CASE NO.: 22CV03359	
13	VICTOR CRUZ,	[Assigned to Hon. Brian McCabe,	
14	Plaintiff,	Courtroom 8]	
15	v.	SECOMD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES	
16	HILMAR CHEESE CO., INC., a California	1. Discrimination (Gov't C. §§ 12900, et seq.);	
17	Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,		
18	Defendants	2. Failure to Accommodate (Gov't C. §§ 12900 et seq.);	
19	Defendants.	3. Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process	
20		(Gov't C. §§ 12940 et seq.)	
21		4. Retaliation (Gov't C. §§ 12900 et seq.);	
22		5. Failure to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation (Gov't	
23		C. § 12900, et seq.);	
24		6. Unfair Competition (Bus. & Professions Code §§ 17200 <i>et. seq.</i>); and	
25		7. Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. C. § 51)	
26		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
27		FAC Filed: November 1, 2022	
28		Trial: September 3, 2024	

COMES NOW Plaintiff, VICTOR CRUZ, and hereby demands a trial by jury, and based on information and belief complains and alleges as follows:

THE PARTIES

- 1. Plaintiff VICTOR CRUZ ("Cruz" or "Plaintiff") is an individual and competent adult who was employed by Defendant HILMAR CHEESE CO., INC. until his unlawful termination.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant
 HILMAR CHEESE CO., INC. ("Defendant" or "HILMAR") was a California corporation
 violating laws within the State of California in the County of Merced.
- 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and each of them, at all times relevant hereto, were individuals or public, business, and/or other entities whose form is unknown committing torts in and/or engaged in purposeful economic activity within the County of Merced, State of California.
- 4. The true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 100, and each of them, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, therefore Plaintiff sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will file DOE amendments and/or seek leave of court to amend this complaint to assert the true names and capacities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that each Defendant herein designated as a DOE was and is in some manner negligently, wrongfully, or otherwise responsible and liable to Plaintiff for the injuries and damages hereinafter alleged, and that Plaintiff's damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by their conduct.
- 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times material herein, Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, or employees, or ostensible agents, servants, and employees of each other Defendant, and as such, were acting within the course and scope of said agency and employment or ostensible agency and employment, except on those occasions when Defendants were acting as principals, in which case, said Defendants, and each of them, were negligent in the selection, hiring, and use of the other Defendants.

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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Facts Relating to Defendant's Fraudulent Scheme and Unlawful and Discriminatory Policies

- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant has approximately 3,000 employees and an annual revenue of approximately \$2,800,000,000 (2.8) billion dollars).
- 14. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that since at least 2007, Defendant has maintained, authorized, ratified, implemented, and instituted an unlawful and discriminatory policy, practice, and procedure which systematically discriminates against employees with disabilities, perceived disabilities, physical impairments, and mental impairments.
- 15. Beginning in or around January 1, 2020, Defendant's unlawful and discriminatory policy, practice, and procedure was maintained in an internal document identified as Defendant's "Leave of Absence Process" (also referred to as Defendant's "standard operating procedures for leaves of absence").

Leave of Absence Process

Human Resources

Department Affected: All

SOP Version: 1

Issue Date: 01/01/2020

Revision Date: 02/18/2020

ADA Interactive Process

Human Recourses

Department Affected: All

SOP Version: 7

Issue Date: 1/3/2020

16. According to Defendant's Leave of Absence Process and standard operating procedures, the first phase of an employee's leave of absence period is the FMLA/CFRA leave, which could last for a period of up to twelve (12) weeks. According to Defendant's policy, should an employee need additional leave beyond the twelve (12) weeks allotted under the FMLA, or if for some reason the employee was not qualified for FMLA/CFRA, the employee would automatically be transitioned to an "MLOA" as a matter of practice and policy.

- 17. An "MLOA" refers to a medical leave of absence, which is additional time off that was provided by Defendant for a maximum of ninety (90) days following the exhaustion of an employee's FMLA leave. Defendant's practice of transitioning employees to an MLOA following the exhaustion of the employee's FMLA leave is referred to herein as Defendant's "MLOA Policy."
- 18. Pursuant to Defendant's MLOA Policy, an employee who exhausted his FMLA leave was automatically transitioned to an MLOA without any interactive process or determination as to whether holding the position open for the employee on medical leave would result in a hardship on Defendant. This process is unlawful and discriminatory on its face, as it directly violates the laws and regulations outlined in Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et. seq., 2 C.C.R. § 11068, and/or 2 C.C.R. § 11067, amongst potentially others, and, as result, discriminates against employees on the basis of their disability in violation of FEHA and the Unruh Act.
- 19. Defendant's MLOA policy expressly states that while an employee is on an MLOA, the employee's "[p]osition may be backfilled":

8.1.2.3. Position may be backfilled;

20. Further, Defendant's MLOA policy expressly states that "an MLOA does not provide job protection":

8.6.3. An MLOA does not provide job protection

21. Not only does Defendant's MLOA Policy expressly state that an MLOA does not provide job protection, but Defendant would also send a letter to employees who required leave beyond their FMLA leave stating, "An MLOA does not provide job protection. During this MLOA, this company has the right to post and fill your original position." This form letter was sent out automatically upon Defendant learning that an employee required more medical leave than what was provided by FMLA:

An MLOA does not provide job protection. During this MLOA, this company has the right to post and fill your original position. This means that should you return to work, per the return to work policies, you

- 22. As part of Defendant's policy, procedure, and practice, Defendant would not engage in any interactive process prior to placing an employee who needed leave on an MLOA.
- 23. Instead, if Defendant learned that an employee needed medical leave beyond what is provided under FMLA, Defendant would only engage in an interactive process under the following circumstances: (1) once the employee provided documentation that he was released to go back to work; or (2) if the employee's position was filled while he was on an MLOA.
- 24. If an employee who attempted to return to work after an MLOA learned that his job had been filled while he was out on an MLOA, Defendant would direct the employee to review a list of open job positions, tell the employee to look through the job positions, and tell the employee to apply for any positions that the employee was interested in working.
- 25. At the time Defendant directed employees returning from an MLOA to review and apply for open job positions, Defendant would not engage in any interactive process with the employee to determine what the employee's qualifications were, nor to help determine which—if any—positions the employee was qualified for.
- 26. Defendant's policy, practice, and procedure of providing employees who are returning from an MLOA after his position has been filled with a list of open job positions, and failing to otherwise engage in an interactive process with those employees, violates the laws and regulations outlined in identified in Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et. seq. and/or 2 C.C.R. § 11067,

amongst potentially others, and, as result, discriminates against employees on the basis of their disability in violation of FEHA and the Unruh Act.

- 27. If an employee ultimately found one or more positions that he was interested in, the employee would be forced to apply, interview, and compete for the job position. Meaning, even if a particular job position was open and funded and the employee was qualified for the position, the employee was not guaranteed the job position, nor would he be provided with preferential treatment in obtaining the job position. This policy, practice, and procedure fails to comply with the laws and regulations identified in Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et. seq. and/or 2 C.C.R. § 11067, amongst potentially others, and, as result, discriminates against employees on the basis of their disability in violation of FEHA and the Unruh Act.
- 28. If an employee whose job was filled while on an MLOA was not selected for a new position to which he applied upon his return from the MLOA, the employee would be administratively terminated by Defendant.
- 29. As a result of Defendants' MLOA Policy, employees with disabilities, physical impairments, and/or mental impairments were routinely, regularly, and systematically discriminated against. This policy, practice, and procedure fails to comply with the laws and regulations identified in Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et. seq., 2 C.C.R. § 11067, 2 C.C.R. § 11068, and/or 2 C.C.R. § 11069, amongst potentially others, and, as result, discriminates against employees on the basis of their disability in violation of FEHA and the Unruh Act.
- 30. One of Defendant's human resources employees indicated that approximately 1 of every 2 employees who was placed on an MLOA would be reassigned upon his return to work following an MLOA. This human resources employee further indicated that several employees she personally handled were terminated after their position was filled while they were on an MLOA.
 - 31. In 2022 alone, approximately 470 employees were placed on an MLOA.

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Facts Relating to Plaintiff's Termination

- 32. Between approximately May 29, 2007, and until his unlawful termination in or around April 2022, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant HILMAR. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant HILMAR as an alpha lac operator. Plaintiff's job duties included but were not limited to monitoring the production of alpha lac from milk whey, making adjustments to the alpha lac processes as necessary, and taking product samples, amongst others.
- 33. During his employment with HILMAR, Plaintiff performed his various responsibilities in an exemplary fashion and otherwise capably performed each and every condition of his employment agreement. Plaintiff was qualified for the position he held by reason of his experience and training.
- 34. For years, Plaintiff has suffered from a physical disability which affects his musculoskeletal system. Specifically, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with chronic back pain, disc degeneration, facet syndrome, and spondylosis without myelopathy (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff's "back injury"). Plaintiff's back injury is a serious disability that interferes with one or more major life activities, including but not limited to standing for long periods of time, constant bending or stooping, and engaging in strenuous physical activities, amongst other things.
- 35. In or around November 2021, Plaintiff's doctor placed Plaintiff off work as a result of his back injury. Plaintiff was placed off work for approximately three (3) months, between approximately November 2021 and February 15, 2022. During that time, Plaintiff visited his doctor approximately twice a month for ongoing treatment related to his back injury. While he was on medical leave, Plaintiff consistently kept HILMAR apprised of his disabled status and medical treatment and provided information related to his projected return to work date.
- 36. On or around January 17, 2022, Plaintiff requested an accommodation in the form of medical leave and provided Defendant with a doctor's note which extended his medical leave until February 17, 2022.
- 37. While Plaintiff's protected leave under FMLA was set to exhaust on or around February 5, 2022, Plaintiff's January 17, 2022 request for an accommodation was that Defendant hold Plaintiff's job open an additional 12 calendar days, or 9 work days, from February 6, 2022

until February 17, 2022. Upon receiving this note, Defendant became aware and understood that Plaintiff had a disability which prevented him from working and that he would need additional leave beyond what FMLA provided.

- 38. On that same day, January 17, 2022, pursuant to Defendant's policies, procedures, and practices, Defendant automatically and as a matter of course informed Plaintiff that he would be transitioned to an "MLOA" (which does not provide job protection) starting on February 6, 2022.
- 39. Specifically, that same day, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter stating, in part, as follows: "Your FMLA will exhaust on 2/5/22 [...] Effective 2/6/22, you will transition from FMLA to MLOA. An MLOA is a company-provided extended leave of absence, which immediately follows the end of FMLA, for a period of up to 90 calendar days [...] An MLOA does not provide job protection. During this MLOA, this company has the right to post and fill your original position." (Emphasis in original.)
- 40. This transition to a non-job protected MLOA occurred without Defendant first engaging in any interactive process or without first making a determination as to whether holding Plaintiff's job open for him between February 6, 2022 and February 17, 2022 would constitute an undue hardship on Defendant.
- 41. The last day that Plaintiff held an employment position with Defendant was on February 5, 2022. On February 6, 2022, Defendant intentionally, recklessly, maliciously engaged in egregious and despicable conduct by starting the process to fill Plaintiff's position, such that Plaintiff would not have a position upon returning from the MLOA.
- 42. On February 15, 2022, Plaintiff's doctor cleared Plaintiff to return to work full duty without restrictions on February 18, 2022. On or around February 16, 2022, Plaintiff provided Defendant HILMAR with his return-to-work order and informed Defendant HILMAR that he was cleared to and intended to return to work without restrictions on February 18, 2022. As such, as of February 16, 2022, Defendant knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff did not need any accommodations for his disability following February 18, 2022.

- 43. Nevertheless, on or around February 17, 2022, HILMAR, knowing and/or consciously disregarding that Plaintiff did not need accommodations, sent Plaintiff a letter stating, "After reviewing your request and your work restrictions, work experience, qualifications, and requested accommodation, [HILMAR] concluded that no reasonable accommodation exists that would allow you to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without a reasonable accommodation." However, Plaintiff did not have any work restrictions at the time he attempted to return to work—no reasonable accommodation was needed. Instead, Plaintiff's medical provider had cleared him to return to work full duty without restrictions. In doing so, Defendant intentionally, recklessly, maliciously engaged in egregious and despicable conduct by removing Plaintiff from his position using a patently false excuse: that Defendant could not accommodate Plaintiff's restrictions, despite that Plaintiff was cleared to return to work for full duty without restrictions.
- 44. To the extent Defendant HILMAR perceived and/or believed that Plaintiff needed accommodations for a disability or perceived disability, Defendant failed to engage in a good faith interactive process and failed to provide accommodations for Plaintiff. Had Defendant engaged in a good faith interactive process, Defendant would have confirmed that Plaintiff did not need any accommodations for his disability.
- 45. Moreover, Defendant further discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff.

 Specifically, Defendant refused to go through open and available positions to reassign Plaintiff to after removing him from his alpha lac assignment, Defendant failed to go through Plaintiff's essential duties and assignments to determine what Plaintiff could do with his restrictions (or lack thereof), and Defendant instead terminated him from his position. Rather, Defendant informed Plaintiff that he could apply to other open positions at HILMAR.
- 46. Defendant failed to comply with its duties and responsibilities under the FEHA and intentionally, recklessly, and maliciously engaged in egregious and despicable conduct by failing to engage in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff upon his return to work. When Plaintiff sought to return to work on or around February 18, 2022, he was informed that he could not return to his position as an alpha lac operator because his position had already been filled. In fact,

Plaintiff's position was not administratively filled until February 21, 2022, three (3) days after Plaintiff was cleared to return to work with no restrictions. Moreover, the employee who filled Plaintiff's position did not start in the position until February 23, 2022, five (5) days after Plaintiff was cleared to return to work with no restrictions.

- 47. As such, Plaintiff applied for another open alpha lac operator position (also referred to by Defendant as the "functional products operator" position). Plaintiff also applied to an open sanitation and reliability operator position and expressed interest in an open whey plant operator position.
- 48. Plaintiff was qualified for the "whey plant operator" position and informed Defendant that he was interested in the whey plant operator position. Defendant did not submit Plaintiff's application for the whey plant operator position, despite there being six (6) funded and vacant whey plant operator positions at the time of Plaintiff's return to work.
- 49. Finally, Plaintiff also applied for the sanitation and reliability operator position.

 Despite being "well qualified" for the position (according to Defendant), and despite the sanitation and reliability position being funded and vacant, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with preferential treatment (as required to by FEHA), and denied Plaintiff the position.
- 50. Defendant continued its discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. Defendant intentionally and maliciously failed to hire, select, transfer, and/or reassign Plaintiff to the positions that Plaintiff reapplied for. Plaintiff was not selected for the position as sanitation officer. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based upon his disability and retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity by taking medical leave and/or for requesting one or more reasonable accommodations, and failed to hire, promote, transfer, or otherwise select Plaintiff for the positions for which he applied.
- 51. Accordingly, Plaintiff was effectively terminated from his employment with HILMAR on or around February 5, 2022.
- 52. Defendant knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff did not quit his job. Rather, Defendant removed and or terminated him from his position, and failed to hire, reassign, transfer, and/or select Plaintiff for an alternate position.

- his only source of income. Therefore, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits through the State of California's Employment Development Department ("EDD"). However, HILMAR intentionally, maliciously, with conscious disregard for the truth, and/or recklessly further discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff by misrepresenting to the EDD that Plaintiff "quit" his job as the reason for Plaintiff's separation from Hilmar. Defendant Hilmar knew, or should have known, that such a misrepresentation would preclude Plaintiff from obtaining unemployment benefits and/or assistance, after no longer having an income. As a result, Plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits, which caused him additional stress, anxiety, and physical ailments. Plaintiff appealed Defendant's purported reason for his separation to the EDD, which found that Plaintiff did not quit as Defendant represented. Defendant's conduct in misrepresenting Plaintiff's separation to EDD was despicable and egregious conduct.
- 54. Subsequently, Defendant's human resources personnel acknowledged and admitted that Plaintiff did not "abandon his job."
- 55. Plaintiff's career has been materially and adversely affected, and irreparably harmed and damaged by the conduct of Defendants. Plaintiff has suffered both general and special damages in the past and present and will continue to suffer such damages in the future for an unknown period. Plaintiff has also suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits, as well as past and future non-economic injury. This has caused damage to his professional reputation, his ability to promote, his ability to be selected for other assignments, his ability to work, will cause him to have to take a different retirement path, has caused him to lose overtime and special assignment opportunities and pay, and will adversely affect his income and other benefits.
- 56. Moreover, it has adversely affected his personal health and wellbeing and has necessitated medical expenses that are anticipated into the future and may force an early retirement. Plaintiff has also suffered extensive general damages in the form of anxiety, anguish, and mental suffering. Plaintiff's damages are continuing and in an amount not yet determined, but in excess of \$25,000.

57. HILMAR's conduct was a violation of Plaintiff's rights under both state and federal law, including but not limited to the Fair Employment and Housing Act (CAL. GOV'T C. §§ 12940, et seq. ("FEHA")), the California Labor Code, the California Business and Professions Code, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Defendants, and each of them, are therefore liable under the FEHA, the Labor Code, the Business and Professions Code, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, is continuing and ongoing as of the present date.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA (CAL. GOV'T C. §§ 12940, ET SEQ.)

- 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 59. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code §§ 12940, *et seq.* was in full force and effect and was binding upon Defendants, and each of them.
- 60. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was in the protected class of persons based on his disability and/or perceived disability, and was one who engaged in protected activities contemplated by Government Code §§ 12940, et seq. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants, and each of them, discriminated against him based on his disability and/or perceived disability, and for reporting and speaking out against wrongful and discriminatory treatment based on his disability, speaking out against improper conduct, and for generally attempting to protect and secure his rights and the rights of other under the FEHA.
- 61. Commencing before and during February 2022, and continuing to the present, Defendants created and allowed to exist a discriminatory environment based on disability and discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his disability and/or perceived disability. Such discrimination was in violation of Government Code §§ 12940, et seq. and the public policy embodied therein. Defendant discriminated based upon his disability and retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging protected activity and for requesting one or more reasonable

accommodations, and failed to hire, promote, transfer, or otherwise select Plaintiff for the positions for which he applied.

- 62. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the discriminatory conduct levied against Plaintiff by Defendants, fellow employees, and superiors. Moreover, such discriminatory conduct was also conducted and/or condoned by Defendants, and each of them.
- 63. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct and failure to act, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff was required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat and care for Plaintiff, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.
- 64. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of the Defendants' discriminatory conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits all to his damage in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court, the precise amount of which will be proven at trial.
- 65. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.
- 66. Defendants, in engaging in the unlawful conduct alleged above, acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice under California Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to exemplary or punitive damages.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE IN VIOLATION OF FEHA (CAL. GOV'T C. § 12940(m))

67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.

- 68. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code § 12940(m) was in full force and effect and was binding upon Defendants, and each of them.
- 69. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was in the protected class of persons based on his disability and/or perceived disability. Defendants, and each of them, knew of Plaintiff's disabling physical condition and/or perceived disability and failed to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for his disability and/or his perceived disability. Defendants, and each of them, believed Plaintiff had requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability and refused such request without justification and without engaging in a good faith interactive process. Instead, Defendant discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff based upon his disability and protected activity, ignored his request to return to work without restrictions, failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff to determine whether a reasonable accommodation was needed or existed, and thereafter failed to hire, promote, transfer, or otherwise select Plaintiff for the positions for which he applied.
- 70. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct and failure to act, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff was required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat and care for Plaintiff, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown to Plaintiff currently.
- 71. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits all to his damage in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court, the precise amount of which will be proven at trial.
- 72. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.

73. Defendants, in engaging in the unlawful conduct alleged above, acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice under California Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to exemplary or punitive damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN INTERACTIVE PROCESS

IN VIOLATION OF FEHA (CAL. GOV'T C. § 12940(n))

- 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 75. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code § 12940(n) was in full force and effect and was binding upon Defendants, and each of them.
- 76. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was in the protected class of persons based on his disability and/or perceived disability. Defendants, and each of them, knew of Plaintiff's disabling physical condition and/or otherwise perceived Plaintiff as being disabled. Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff, failed to offer him alternative positions, and/or refused to allow him to return to his position without restrictions. Moreover, and/or alternatively, Defendant perceived Plaintiff as having a disability and failed to offer or accommodate Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff having no restrictions and being able to return to full duty. Defendants, and each of them, failed and refused to participate in a timely good-faith interactive process with Plaintiff to determine whether a reasonable accommodation was needed, or whether a reasonable accommodation existed.
- 77. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct and failure to act, including their failure to engage in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff was required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat and care for Plaintiff, and did, and will in the

future, incur medical and incidental expenses. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.

- 78. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' harassing conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits all to his damage in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court, the precise amount of which will be proven at trial.
- 79. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.
- 80. Defendants, in engaging in the unlawful conduct alleged above, acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice under California Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to exemplary or punitive damages.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA (CAL. GOV'T C. §§ 12940, ET SEQ.)

- 81. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 82. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code §§ 12940, et seq., was in full force and effect and were binding upon Defendants, and each of them. Said sections required Defendants, and each of them, to refrain from retaliating against an employee for his opposition to employment practices prohibited under FEHA, as well as for requesting a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
- 83. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was in the protected class of persons based on his disability and/or perceived disability, and is one who engaged in protected activities contemplated by Government Code §§ 12940, et seq. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting accommodations, taking protected leave and accommodations, and for Defendant's perceived belief that Plaintiff requested

additional accommodations for a disability based upon Plaintiff's disability and/or perceived disability, for speaking out against inappropriate workplace behavior, for reporting and speaking out against wrongful and discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory treatment based on his disability and/or perceived disability, for speaking out against improper conduct, and for generally attempting to protect and secure his rights and the rights of others under the FEHA.

- 84. Commencing before and during February 2022, and continuing to the present, Defendants created and allowed to exist a hostile environment for those with disabilities and/or perceived disabilities and retaliated against Plaintiff on the basis of his protected activity, including for requesting accommodations, taking protected leave and accommodations, and for Defendant's perceived belief that Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation as set forth herein. Such retaliation was in violation of Government Code §§ 12940, et seq. and the public policy embodied therein. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based upon his disability and/or perceived disability and retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging protected activity and/or because Defendant believed Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation. Further, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to hire, promote, transfer, or otherwise select Plaintiff for the positions for which he applied.
- 85. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the retaliatory conduct levied against Plaintiff by Defendants, fellow employees, and superiors. Moreover, such retaliation, harassment, and discriminatory conduct was also conducted and/or condoned by Defendants, and each of them.
- 86. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff was required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat and care for Plaintiff, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.

- 87. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of the Defendants' retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits all to his damage in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court, the precise amount of which will be proven at trial.
- 88. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.
- 89. Defendants, in engaging in the unlawful conduct alleged above, acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice under California Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to exemplary or punitive damages.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA (CAL. GOV'T C. §§ 12900, ET SEQ.)

- 90. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 91. At all times mentioned herein, Government Code section 12900, *et seq.*, was in full force and effect and was fully binding upon Defendants. Specifically, section 12940(k) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination based on an employee's disability and/or perceived disability and retaliation based on an employee's protected activity, including for requesting a reasonable accommodation.
- 92. Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and retaliation in the workplace, and Defendants, having knowledge of same, failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the discrimination and retaliation by subjecting Plaintiff to adverse employment actions, including but not limited to failing to engage in an interactive process with Plaintiff, failing to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff, failing to hire, promote, and/or transfer Plaintiff, and terminating Plaintiff's employment, amongst other adverse actions.

- 93. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff was required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat and care for Plaintiff, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.
- 94. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants' retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other employment benefits all to his damage in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court, the precise amount of which will be proven at trial.
- 95. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.
- 96. Defendants, in engaging in the unlawful conduct alleged above, acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, and annoy Plaintiff, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice under California Civil Code § 3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to exemplary or punitive damages.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

UNFAIR COMPETITION IN VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. C. §§ 17200, ET SEQ.

- 97. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 98. California Business and Professions Code §17200 provides, in relevant part: "As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code." Violations of other statutes, including the FEHA as alleged herein, which constitute unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices also violate the California Business and

Professions Code unfair competition law ("UCL") and give rise to a claim for relief as specified in Business & Professions Code § 17203.

- 99. Plaintiff was subjected to a discriminatory and unlawful policy that was directed at employees of Defendants who had one or more disabilities and/or who were perceived as being disabled. Specifically, Defendants' unlawful and discriminatory policies, procedures, and practices systematically reassigned and terminated disabled employees who required a medical leave of absence, all in violation of the FEHA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By the conducted described above and herein, Defendants intentionally violated the rights of Plaintiff under the FEHA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
- 100. Through the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have acted contrary to the public policies of the FEHA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California Business and Professions Code, have violated specific provisions of the FEHA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and have engaged in other unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§17200, et seq., thus depriving Plaintiff of rights, benefits, and privileges guaranteed to all employees in California. Defendants' conduct as alleged herein constitutes unfair competition in violation of section 17200 et seq. of the California Business and Professions Code.
- 101. The acts of Defendants as alleged herein were unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent as defined in California Business and Professions Code §17200. Such acts constitute an unfair business practice and unfair competition, thus violating California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. As a result, Defendants obtained valuable property, money, and/or services from Plaintiff, including earned wages for all hours worked, and have deprived Plaintiff of valuable rights and benefits guaranteed by law, all to the detriment of Plaintiff and to the benefit of Defendants so as to allow Defendants to unfairly compete against competitors who comply with the law.
- 102. As a result of the foregoing conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to recover restitution and is entitled to injunctive relief.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(CAL. CIV. C. §§ 51, 52)

- 103. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein again.
- 104. The Unruh Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful to deny any person, on the basis of disability, full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in any business establishment of any kind whatsoever. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 51(b).) The FEHA prohibits any person from denying rights created by the Unruh Act or aiding, inciting, or conspiring in such denial. (Cal. Gov. C. § 12948.)
- 105. Defendants, and each of them, had a policy, practice, and procedure which intentionally and arbitrarily denied Plaintiff full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in a business establishment because of Plaintiff's disability, and/or arbitrarily aided, incited, or conspired in such denial. Defendants thereby violated Plaintiff's rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
- 106. As a result of Defendant's alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff suffered damages, including economic and non-economic damages, in an amount to be determined at trial.
- 107. Plaintiff is entitled to damages in any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to three times the amount of actual damages, for each violation of his rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
- 108. Defendants' actions were willful, malicious, fraudulent, and oppressive and were committed with the wrongful intent to injure Plaintiff, and in conscious disregard of his rights as defined in Civil Code § 3294, in that Defendants willfully and intentionally, and without just cause, deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights under the laws of the State of California, entitling him to an award of exemplary and punitive damages.

109. By violating the Unruh Civil Rights Act as alleged, Defendants demonstrated that they are likely to continue to engage in the pattern and practice of unlawful discrimination that is the subject of this Complaint.

Causes of Action for:

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Health care, services, supplies, medicines, health care appliances, modalities, and other related expenses in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;

benefits, and other economic damages in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;

indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical, mental, and emotional reactions, damages to

reputation, and other non-economic damages, in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;

PRAYER

nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured feelings, shock, humiliation, and

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks judgment against all Defendants, and each of them, on all

Physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anguish, fright,

Loss of wages, income, earnings, earning capacity, support, domestic services,

4. Other actual, consequential, and/or incidental damages in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;

- 5. For Treble Damages;
- 6. Attorney fees and costs of suit pursuant to statute;
- 7. Costs of suit herein incurred;
- 8. Pre-judgment interest;
- 9. For punitive and exemplary damages in amounts to be proven at the time of trial;
- 10. That the Court issue declaratory judgment against Defendant, finding that its "medical leave of absence" or "MLOA" policy, practice, and procedure violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and that Defendant discriminated against individuals with disabilities in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and, as such, constituted an unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent business practice in violation of California's UCL;
- 11. That the Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction pursuant to the FEHA and the UCL, enjoining Defendants, its officers, agents, employees, and all others acting for or succeeding Defendants from engaging in the unlawful employment practices alleged in this Second Amended Complaint that discriminate against Plaintiff and Defendant's other employees, in

1	violation of the FEHA and the UCL on the basis of disability, physical impairment, and/or mental		
2	impairment.		
3	12. That the Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering and requiring		
4	Defendant to formulate, institute, adopt, and maintain policies and practices which will provide		
5	equal employment opportunities to Plaintiff, employees of Defendant, and future employees of		
6	Defendant, that have disabilities, physical impairments, and/or mental impairments.		
7	13. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.		
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9	Dated: November 3, 2023 KENT PINCIN		
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11			
12	By:		
13	Michael J. Kent Emily R. Pincin		
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff VICTOR CRUZ		
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17	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL		
18	Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial.		
19	Framum nereby demands a jury trial.		
20	Dated: November 3, 2023 KENT PINCIN		
21			
22			
23	By:		
24	Michael J. Kent Emily R. Pincin		
25	Attorneys for Plaintiff VICTOR CRUZ		
26	TOTOR CROZ		
27			
28			

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4	I am a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 120 Fisherman's Wharf, Redondo Beach, CA 90277.
5	
6	On November 20, 2023, I served the attached STIPULATION AND ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on the interested parties in said action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed as
7	stated below:
8	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
9	☐ (BY MAIL) I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail in Redondo Beach, CA to be served on the parties as indicated on the attached service list. I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
11	correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Redondo Beach, CA in the ordinary
12	course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing
13	în affidavit.
14	☐ (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand via NOW MESSENGER to the offices of the addressee.
15 16	□ (BY FACSIMILE) The above-described document (s) were sent by facsimile transmission to the facsimile number(s) of the law office(s) stated above. The transmission was reported as complete and without error. A copy of the transmission report is made a part of this proof of service pursuant to CRC § 2008.
18	X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) The above-described document(s) were sent by electronic transmission to the law office(s) stated in the attached Service List. The transmission was reported as complete and without error.
20 21 22 23	☐ (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) I placed the package for overnight delivery in a box or location regularly maintained at my office or I delivered the package to an authorized courier or driver authorized to receive DOCUMENTS. The package was placed in a sealed envelope or package designated with delivery fees paid or provided for, addressed to the person(s) on whom it is to be served at the address(es) shown above, at the office address(es) as last given by that person on any document filed in the cause and served on the party making service; otherwise at that party's place of residence.
24	X (State) I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
25 26	☐ (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.
27	Executed on November 20, 2023, at Redondo Beach, California.
28	Michael J. Kent

SERVICE LIST

Cruz v. Hilmar Cheese Co., Inc. Superior Court – County of Merced Case No. 22CV03559

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